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Introduction
Empirical research suggests that employees have a preference to conform to social norms within their …rm, even if this requires taking costly actions. 1 Given that employees conform to social norms, …rms have an incentive to a¤ect these norms. After all, a …rm only bene…ts from employee conformism to the extent that the existing norms prescribe to act in the …rm's interest. From a practical point of view, an important question is therefore how …rms can increase pro…ts by creating e¢ cient norms. From a theoretical point of view, an important question is whether and how …rms' desire to create e¢ cient norms can explain …rm behavior and organization. This paper develops and analyzes a theoretical model that yields answers to both questions.
The novelty of the present analysis is its focus on a particular determinant of norms for employees, namely the actual behavior of superiors. Apart from being intuitive, there is empirical evidence suggesting that the example of superiors has normative implications for subordinates. Treviño et al. (1999) …nd a strong negative correlation between employees'perceptions of, on the one hand, the quality of ethical leadership of executives and supervisors within their …rm, and on the other hand, unethical behavior within their …rm (also see Treviño and Weaver 2003, chapter 9, where similar evidence is reported). In line with this, Posner and Schmidt (1992) document that 92% of American managers agree with the statement that "the behavior of those in charge is the principle determinant of the 'ethical tone' of my …rm". This view is con…rmed by J. Irwin Miller, a successful CEO himself, who claims that "all of the corporate standards of ethics don't mean anything unless the persons in the corporation perceive the top people to abide by them when the going is really tough" (quoted from Murphy and Enderle 1995) .
The formal model studied below considers a hierarchical …rm that consists of three layers: a residual claimant principal, a supervisor, and an agent. All players exert non-veri…able e¤ort which yields valuable production for the principal's …rm. Both employees (the supervisor and the agent) incur a psychological cost if their e¤ort falls short of their norm for e¤ort, as in e.g. Fischer and Huddart (2008) . To re ‡ect the evidence cited above, employees consider the example of their superior to be the norm for their own e¤ort. Hence, the principal's e¤ort constitutes the norm for the supervisor, and the supervisor's e¤ort constitutes the norm for the agent. The remaining part of the Introduction describes the results of the paper.
The key result from the analysis is that, in equilibrium, norms are lower as one moves down the hierarchy. I call this phenomenon 'norm erosion'. Norm erosion arises because when exerting e¤ort, employees take into account the example of their superior, but never fully comply with it. The reason is simple: employees …nd it privately optimal to trade o¤ some costs of performing below the norm against the bene…t of avoiding some e¤ort costs. It follows that each employee sets an example for his subordinate that is lower than the example he got from his superior. The upshot from this result is that e¤ort norms within …rms are not only determined by the example set at the top of the hierarchy, but also by how this example is transmitted to lower organizational layers. Since …rms do not control this process, they incur a number of costs when creating optimal e¤ort norms for employees, as explained next.
To understand why norm erosion is costly to …rms, one needs to know that there is a unique …rst-best e¤ort norm for employees. This holds because a higher norm induces more valuable e¤ort from the employee, but also imposes more e¤ort costs and norm violation costs upon the employee for which he must be compensated through his salary. The …rst-best norm optimally trades o¤ these marginal costs and bene…ts. Next, when choosing how much e¤ort to exert, the principal has two objectives in mind. On the one hand, she wants to set the …rst-best norm for her employees. On the other hand, she wants to maximize her own contribution to …rm pro…ts. The e¤ort level that maximizes the principal's own contribution to …rm pro…ts is referred to as the principal's …rst-best e¤ort level. Under a mild assumption that I use, it holds that the principal's …rst-best e¤ort level is identical to the …rstbest norm for both employees. It follows that if there were no norm erosion, the principal would maximize total pro…ts by exerting her …rst-best e¤ort level. However, knowing that the supervisor will erode her example, the principal optimally sets a higher example to begin with. In this way the principal makes sure that the agent's equilibrium norm is closer to its …rst-best level. The cost of this strategy is two-fold: the principal works ine¢ ciently hard, and the supervisor faces an ine¢ ciently high norm. Compared to the …rst-best case, hierarchical …rms are thus confronted with three ine¢ ciencies in norm creation: the principal's e¤ort is too high, the supervisor's norm is too high, and the agent's norm is too low. The remaining results show that, to minimize these ine¢ ciencies, hierarchical …rms optimally adjust the way they are organized.
First, hierarchical …rms optimally promote employees with the strongest sensitivity to social norms. A supervisor who is more sensitive to norms will conform to the principal's example to a larger extent. As a result, norms are eroded to a lower extent, which is always valuable to the principal. The reason is that establishing a given e¤ort norm for the agent now requires a lower e¤ort level from the principal. This is pro…table since in equilibrium the principal works ine¢ ciently hard and the supervisor's norm is ine¢ ciently high. Alternatively, for a given e¤ort level of the principal and norm for the supervisor, the agent will be faced with a higher norm. This is also pro…table because in equilibrium the agent's norm is ine¢ ciently low.
Second, hierarchical …rms optimally distort the supervisor's span of control, that is, the number of agents heading under one supervisor. The analysis shows that …rms may set the supervisor's span of control both above and below its …rst-best level. The mechanism that produces these results is the following. In the model I assume that for supervision technology reasons, there is some …rst-best supervisor span of control. When choosing how many supervisors and agents to hire, the principal thus has an incentive to stick as closely as possible to this exogenously given span of control. However, the …rm's pro…ts also depend on which kind of employee faces the most e¢ cient e¤ort norm in equilibrium. Recall that the equilibrium norm for supervisors is always above the …rst-best level, whereas the equilibrium norm for agents is always below the …rst-best level. Yet, the extent to which equilibrium norms diverge from the …rst-best level may be di¤erent for agents and supervisors. In fact, the principal optimally makes sure that the kind of employee that is relatively abundant faces the more e¢ cient norm. The principal does this by raising her own e¤ort level in the number of agents, and by decreasing her e¤ort in the number of supervisors. Therefore, given that the supervision technology is such that it is attractive to hire relatively many agents (supervisors), the principal optimally makes sure that the e¤ort norm for agents (supervisors) is more e¢ cient than the e¤ort norm for supervisors (agents), which in turn makes it attractive to hire even more agents (supervisors). As a result, the principal optimally distorts the supervisor's span of control away from its …rst-best level.
Last, hierarchical …rms su¤er from norm erosion precisely because they are hierarchical. A straightforward prediction following from the model is therefore that …rms optimally keep the extent of hierarchy to a minimum.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the related literature. Section 3 develops the formal model. Section 4 solves the model, while section 5 explores implications for organizational design. Section 6 …nishes with concluding remarks.
Related literature
Empirical research suggests that employees have a preference to conform to social norms within their …rm. Ichino and Maggi (2000) show that employees engage less in misconduct and absent themselves less often if their co-workers are less likely to do so (also see Bradley et al. 2007 ). Falk and Ichino (2006) report that, if employees work in pairs rather than individually, the standard deviation of output is smaller and output is higher. Moreover, the authors …nd that low-productivity employees respond strongest to working in pairs. Mas and Moretti (2009) …nd that supermarket cashiers improve their performance if a high-productivity cashier enters their shift. As in Falk and Ichino (2006) , this e¤ect is far more pronounced for low-productivity workers than for high-productivity workers. Mas and Moretti (2009) provide a social pressure interpretation for their results, based on the …nding that cashiers only improve their performance if this can be observed by the new cashier. Finally, in a controlled work environment, Bradler et al. (2013) show that the provision of public recognition to employees improves their performance. Similar to Falk and Ichino (2006) and Mas and Moretti (2009) , the authors …nd that their results are mainly driven by those employees who did not receive recognition, and thus learned that they performed worse than others. For this reason, Bradler et al. (2013) explain their results partly in terms of employees'preference to conform to a group norm.
An early theoretical paper studying social norms is Akerlof (1980) . Akerlof's (1980) model shows that an existing norm may stay in place if deviating from the norm leads to a loss in reputation (also see Bernheim 1994 , who assumes that people care for others'perceptions of one's preferences). Another early contribution is the paper by Kandel and Lazear (1992) , who study peer pressure as a mechanism that may reduce free-riding problems in team production.
More recently, Sliwka (2007) develops a model where agents may prefer to conform their e¤ort to the social norm, but are uncertain about what the social norm prescribes. This opens the door for the principal to a¤ect the agent's perception of the social norm through her own actions. Speci…cally, Sliwka (2007) shows that o¤ering incentives may be a credible signal that the social norm is to act sel…shly, whereas o¤ering no incentives may be a credible signal that the social norm is to act fairly, that is, to exert at least some e¤ort. Fischer and Huddart (2008) study …rms where norms exist for desirable actions (like exerting e¤ort) and undesirable actions (like earnings management). The authors show that social norms multiply the impact of individual incentives on agents'behavior. The reason is that individual incentives change an individual agent's behavior, but this also a¤ects the social norm to which all agents want to conform. Fischer and Huddart (2008) also show that it may be optimal to split …rms in parts. The bene…t is that having separate departments allows for the cultivation of di¤erent social norms for di¤erent tasks.
Stevens and Thevaranjan (2010) study optimal e¢ ciency wage contracts for morally sensitive agents. The authors assume that the principal can declare what the e¤ort norm is at the contracting stage. Stevens and Thevaranjan (2010) show that, when hiring a morally sensitive agent, the principal may achieve …rst-best profits even when she does not use incentives. Huck et al. (2012) de…ne social norms in terms of Pareto e¢ ciency. Given this de…nition, the authors demonstrate that a social norm makes team-incentives more e¤ective. The reason is that team-incentives create positive externalities among employees, which leads to a higher social norm for e¤ort. The opposite reasoning applies to using relative incentives like tournaments. Huck et al. (2012) further show that, if team incentives are used, social norms may give rise to multiple equilibria, some of which may lead to ine¢ ciently high social norms. Akerlof and Kranton (2005) introduce the notion that a person's utility may depend on his or her social identity. In their model, a social identity exogenously implies some norm for behavior. Akerlof and Kranton (2005) show that employees identifying with the …rm accept lower wages and require lower incentives. The authors consequently claim that it is valuable for …rms to invest in changing their employees'identity (also see Heinle et al. 2012 , who derive optimal contracts when agents may identify with the …rm in a multi-task setting). Carlin and Gervais (2009) model morality as a self-imposed restriction to exert high e¤ort. In their analysis, norms are thus a purely personal trait that cannot be a¤ected by the …rm in any way. The authors derive a number of predictions as to how the presence of virtuous agents in the labor market a¤ect …rms'optimal contract design, project choice, and extent of bureaucracy.
In contrast to all papers above, the starting point of the analysis here is that the actual example of superiors determines e¤ort norms for employees. Norms are thus not exogenously given (as in Akerlof More distantly related to the present paper is Hermalin's (1998) analysis of leadership. Hermalin (1998) studies how a leader can credibly communicate information to his team-members about the marginal productivity of their e¤ort. One of the mechanisms Hermalin (1998) considers is 'leading by example'. That is, if the leader exerts a high e¤ort level and thereby incurs high e¤ort costs, this credibly signals to the other team-members that exerting e¤ort is valuable. The parallel between Hermalin (1998) and the present analysis is the importance of the leader's example for the behavior of others. However, di¤erent problems are studied. In Hermalin's (1998) analysis the credible transmission of information is at stake, whereas here the principal sets her example so as to create optimal e¤ort norms for her employees.
Finally, another important di¤erence with the existing literature is that the present analysis considers hierarchical …rms that consist of at least three layers. Hence, I do not only study how the example at the top of the hierarchy matters for e¤ort norms, but also the process of transmitting this example to lower layers of the hierarchy. In fact, the key result of the paper is to show that this process is ine¢ cient from the …rm's perspective.
A model of e¤ort norms in hierarchical …rms
Consider a hierarchical …rm owned by one principal. The principal's organizational layer is denoted by l = 0. In the most basic speci…cation of the model, the principal hires one supervisor (l = 1) and one agent (l = 2) (subsection 5.2 extends the model to the case where the principal hires S supervisors and A agents). All players exert unveri…able e¤ort e l , which yields valuable production for the principal's …rm. The marginal product of e¤ort is given by p l . I assume that p l p l+1 , implying that a player in a higher layer of the organization has a weakly higher marginal productivity. The costs of exerting e¤ort are given by 1 2 e 2 l . Employee utility from the job is given by:
where w l denotes a …xed wage (in the Appendix, I show that as long as employees are risk averse, the results of the paper are insensitive to the use of performance pay). The last term in (1) describes the employee's preference for conforming to social norms, which consists of two parts. The term n l e l describes how much the employee's e¤ort di¤ers from the norm for e¤ort, n l . The parameter re ‡ects the strength of the employee's sensitivity to norms. In the basic model, is assumed to be identical for all employees (section 5.1 extends the model to the case where employees di¤er in norm sensitivity). Throughout the paper, I assume that the principal can observe . The outside option utility is assumed to be identical for all employees, and equal to u = 0.
The novelty of the model is how social norms for e¤ort are determined. Formally, the e¤ort norm for an employee in organizational layer l is given by:
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The e¤ort norm consists of two parts. First, as laid out in the Introduction, the actual behavior of superiors plays an important role in shaping norms within organizations. Hence, I assume that the supervisor's norm is a¤ected by the principal's e¤ort, and the agent's norm is a¤ected by the supervisor's e¤ort. 2 Second, I assume that employees are aware of the fact that their superior's e¤ort may be more valuable than their own (p l 1 > p l ). If this is the case, from an e¢ ciency point of view, the superior should work harder than the employee. For this reason, I assume that employees do not consider their superior's e¤ort to be normative to the extent that the superior's marginal productivity is higher. This behavioral assumption implies that, qualitatively, the results of the paper do not depend on di¤erences in marginal productivities p l . For convenience, I therefore solve the model assuming that marginal productivities are identical across organizational layers, that is, p l = p for all l. It follows that norms are given by:
The order of the game is as follows. First, the principal exerts an e¤ort level, and thereby sets an example. Second, the principal hires at least one supervisor and one agent, and o¤ers all employees a compensation contract. Third, the employees decide whether or not to accept the contract. If one of them rejects the contract, the game ends. Last, if all employees accepted the contract, they exert e¤ort and payo¤s realize. In the next section, I solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game by using backwards induction.
Analysis

Contractible e¤ort
In this subsection, I derive the …rst-best benchmark where the employees'e¤ort is veri…able and thus contractible. First note that, to satisfy the employees'participation constraint, they must be paid a minimum salary equal to:
Given the lowest possible salary (4), and taking into account that the norm for layer l is given by the e¤ort level exerted in layer l 1, …rm pro…ts can be written as:
. (5) Maximizing …rm pro…ts (5) over all players'e¤ort levels yields that all players optimally exert the e¤ort level e F B l = p . From this it follows directly that the …rst-best e¤ort norm for employees is given by n F B l = p . First-best pro…ts become:
Lemma 1 In the …rst-best case where e¤ort is contractible, all players exert the e¤ort level e F B l = p . The …rst-best e¤ort norm for both employees therefore equals n F B l = p .
Note that, when choosing her e¤ort, the principal has two objectives in mind. On the one hand, she wants to maximize her individual production (…rst term of (5)). On the other hand, she wants to set the most e¢ cient norm for the supervisor (second term of (5)). However, the principal does not face a trade-o¤ between these two objectives. That is, the …rst-best e¤ort level e F B 0 both maximizes the principal's individual production, and sets the most e¢ cient norm for the supervisor. The reason is that the principal and the supervisor have the same marginal productivity of e¤ort p. Moreover, even if the supervisor had a lower marginal productivity than the principal (p 1 < p 0 ), the principal would not face a trade-o¤ between the objectives mentioned above. This holds because of the assumption that, to the extent that the principal's marginal productivity is higher, the supervisor does not consider the principal's e¤ort level to be normative (see equation (2)). Also note that the exact same considerations apply when the principal mandates the supervisor's e¤ort level. In the next subsection, I show that when e¤ort is not contractible, the principal does face a trade-o¤ between maximizing the value of her own production and setting e¢ cient norms for her employees.
Non-contractible e¤ort
In case e¤ort is not contractible, the …rst step in solving the model is to derive the employees'e¤ort level for any given e¤ort norm and compensation contract. Since the employee's wage w l is …xed, the e¤ort level that maximizes employee utility (1) equals: e l = n l ,
where + , and it holds that 0 < < 1. It can easily be veri…ed that employee e¤ort increases in , and therefore in the employee's norm sensitivity . The intuition is that deviating from the norm is more costly for an employee who possesses stronger norm sensitivity. Next, employee e¤ort also increases in the norm n l , as a higher norm implies higher costs of norm violation for a given level of e¤ort. Finally, since it holds that < 1, an employee always exerts less e¤ort than his norm prescribes. The intuition is that employees trade o¤ some costs of performing below the norm against the bene…t of shirking. This simple fact has an important implication for hierarchical …rms, namely that each employee transmits a norm towards the next layer of the organization that is lower than the norm he faces himself. Therefore, as one moves down the hierarchy, e¤ort norms decrease. I call this phenomenon 'norm erosion'. The existence of norm erosion is the …rst result of the analysis, and all remaining results follow from this one.
Proposition 1 A feature of hierarchical …rms is norm erosion, that is, n l > n l+1 for all l.
The second step in solving the model is to derive the optimal wage w l . The optimal wage is the lowest possible wage that induces the employee to accept the job, conditional on the e¤ort level the employee exerts (e l ), and the norm he faces (n l ). This constraint reads U l (w l ; e l ; n l ) 0. Rewriting this condition to w l yields:
The employee's wage increases in the norm he faces. The reason is two-fold. First, a higher norm induces the agent to exert more e¤ort. Second, given his e¤ort choice, a higher norm implies that the agent will incur higher costs of norm violation. The optimal wage also increases in , and therefore in employee norm sensitivity . Norm sensitivity has two e¤ects on the wage. First, the employee incurs higher costs of e¤ort if norm sensitivity is stronger, implying the wage must increase. Second, norm sensitivity has two e¤ects on the employee's costs of norm violation. On the one hand, given his e¤ort level, stronger norm sensitivity implies that the employee incurs greater psychological costs from performing below the norm. On the other hand, higher norm sensitivity implies that the employee exerts a higher e¤ort level, which reduces the violation of the norm. However, the net e¤ect of norm sensitivity on the wage is always positive, as made apparent by equation (8) .
The …nal step in solving the model is to derive the principal's e¤ort level. Conditional on the de…nition of e¤ort norms (3), the employees'e¤ort levels (7) and wages (8) , total …rm pro…ts can be written as:
Clearly, the principal's e¤ort not only a¤ects the value of her individual production (…rst term), but, by setting an example, also a¤ects the value of hiring the supervisor (second term) and the agent (third term). This is also re ‡ected in the e¤ort level the principal optimally exerts. Maximizing …rm pro…ts over e 0 yields that this is equal to:
It can be easily checked that the principal's e¤ort exceeds the …rst-best level derived in Lemma 1. This is the second result of the analysis:
The principal exerts an e¤ort level that is higher than her …rst-best e¤ort level (e 0 > e F B 0 ). To understand the result of Proposition 2, recall from Lemma 1 that the …rstbest norm for the supervisor and agent is given by n F B l = p . Hence, if the principal would exert the e¤ort level e F B 0 = p , she would maximize the value of her individual production, and set the …rst-best norm for the supervisor. However, as derived in Proposition 1, the supervisor will erode the principal's example. The implication is that, if e 0 = p , the equilibrium norm for the agent will be ine¢ ciently low. In response to this, the principal optimally sets a higher example to begin with, and thus raises her e¤ort above e F B 0 . Note that the result of Proposition 1 directly implies that the supervisor's norm is above the …rst-best level (recall that n F B l = p ). In addition to this, it holds that the agent's norm is below the …rst-best level. 3 Intuitively, it can never be optimal that the agent's norm exceeds the …rst-best level. After all, driving the agent's norm closer to the …rst-best level imposes two costs on the principal: the principal's e¤ort is ine¢ ciently high (Proposition 2), and as a result, the supervisor's norm is ine¢ ciently high. It follows that it may be optimal to raise the agent's norm up to the …rst-best level, but not higher than that. Hence, norm erosion ultimately implies the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 Compared to the …rst-best benchmark, the e¤ort norm for the supervisor is ine¢ ciently high (n 1 > n F B 1 ), whereas the e¤ort norm for the agent is ine¢ciently low (n 2 < n F B 2 ).
Another result that norm erosion gives rise to is described in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2 Firms optimally keep the number of organizational layers to a minimum.
The intuition behind Corollary 2 is straightforward. So far, the analysis has shown that hierarchical …rms are confronted with three ine¢ ciencies in creating optimal norms for employees: the principal works too hard, the supervisor's norm is too high, and the agent's norm is too low. Hierarchical …rms incur these costs because of norm erosion, which arises if intermediate layers of management are in place. Moreover, for any organizational layer added to the …rm, the ine¢ ciencies from norm erosion would be magni…ed. It follows that …rms optimally keep the number of organizational layers to a minimum. In the remainder of the paper, I assume that the principal requires supervisors to let agents do their job. A motivation for this assumption is that the principal simply cannot supervise all the agents she hires, and hence needs to delegate this task. Also see subsection 5.2, where I study how many supervisors and agents the principal optimally hires.
Implications for organizational design
This section o¤ers two extensions of the basic model analyzed above. Both extensions yield a result as to how hierarchical …rms can be better designed to reduce the ine¢ ciencies stemming from norm erosion. In following order, I discuss promotion decisions and managerial spans of control.
Promotion decisions
In contrast to what has been assumed in the basic model, employees are likely to di¤er in their sensitivity to social norms. Given this heterogeneity, a natural question is which kind of employee the principal should optimally promote to the position of supervisor. To study this question, denote by q the norm sensitivity of employee q, and by r the norm sensitivity of employee r. Using the de…nition + , one can also de…ne q and r . Firm pro…ts can now be written as:
where it has been assumed that employee q is appointed supervisor. Next, the principal optimally exerts the level of e¤ort that maximizes …rm pro…ts. This e¤ort level can be shown to be equal to:
which is greater than the …rst-best level, as in Proposition 2. Equilibrium pro…ts become:
Note that in case employee r is promoted to the position of supervisor, equilibrium pro…ts are simply given by interchanging the subscripts q and r in (13) .
To determine whether the principal optimally promotes employee q or r, one can compute which case yields higher pro…ts. Promoting employee q yields higher pro…ts than promoting employee r if: 
After some rewriting, this inequality reduces to q > r . In words, it is most pro…table to promote the employee who has the strongest sensitivity to norms.
Proposition 3 Hierarchical …rms optimally promote employees with the strongest sensitivity to social norms.
The intuition behind this result can be explained as follows. If the supervisor possesses stronger norm sensitivity, norms are eroded to a lower extent. Less norm erosion is always valuable to the principal. On the one hand, for any given e¤ort choice of the principal, the agent will face a higher norm in equilibrium. Since the agent's norm is always ine¢ ciently low (Corollary 1), this is pro…t-increasing. On the other hand, the principal can reduce her e¤ort such that the agent's norm remains the same. This is also pro…t-increasing, since the principal's e¤ort and the supervisor's norm are always ine¢ ciently high (Proposition 2 and Corollary 1). 13 
Managerial spans of control
The basic model assumes that the principal hires only one supervisor and one agent. More realistic is that the …rm hires a number of S supervisors and A agents. Moreover, …rms tend to maintain some relationship between the number of hired supervisors and agents. In the literature, the number of agents heading under one supervisor is referred to as the supervisor's span of control. Analogously, the number of supervisors heading under the principal is referred to as the principal's span of control. In this extension, I study how managerial spans of control are a¤ected by the principal's desire to create e¢ cient norms for her employees.
In case the …rm hires S supervisors and A agents, …rm pro…ts are given by:
where w 1 and w 2 must satisfy the employees'participation constraint (4). The pro…t function above is di¤erent from the one used in the basic model in two respects. First, to obtain an interior solution, I assume that the marginal pro…tability from hiring a supervisor or agent is decreasing. This is re ‡ected by the terms 1 2 k 1 S 2 and 1 2 k 2 A 2 . Second, the parameters k 1 and k 2 together describe the supervision technology of the …rm. As will be shown below, for low values of k 1 and high values of k 2 , the principal needs relatively many supervisors to supervise the agents, whereas for high values of k 1 and low values of k 2 the reverse holds.
Before I derive the optimal managerial spans of control, it is instructive to consider the …rst-best benchmark where e¤ort is contractible. Using the results from Lemma 1, it is straightforward to derive the following Lemma. In the …rst-best case, there is no moral hazard problem in e¤ort provision. Since supervisors and agents have the same marginal productivity of e¤ort, it follows that di¤erences in the marginal pro…tability of hiring a supervisor or agents can only arise because of di¤erences in the technology parameters k 1 and k 2 . As a result, in the …rst-best case, the optimal supervisor span of control is uniquely determined by k 1 and k 2 .
In the remainder of this subsection, I study the optimal managerial spans of control in case e¤ort is not contractible. Given the de…nition of e¤ort norms (3), employees'e¤ort choice (7) , and the employees'salary (8) , …rm pro…ts can be written as:
.
(16) The principal will exert the e¤ort level that maximizes (16) , which is given by:
It holds that e 0 > e F B 0 for any A > 0, as in Proposition 2. It can easily be checked that the principal's e¤ort decreases in S, but increases in A. 4 To understand these results, remember that the norm for supervisors is always above its …rst-best level, whereas the norm for agents is always below its …rst-best level (Corollary 1). Further, if the number of supervisors increases, their organizational layer makes up a larger share of …rm pro…ts. Therefore it becomes more important for the principal to have supervisors face an e¢ cient norm. It follows that the principal optimally reduces her e¤ort if S increases. The reverse intuition holds for the number of agents hired. The principal thus adjusts her e¤ort in the direction that improves the e¤ort norm for the kind of employee that becomes more abundant.
Proposition 4
The principal's e¤ort decreases in the number of supervisors hired, @e 0 @S < 0, and increases in the number of agents hired, @e 0 @A > 0.
The next step is to determine the optimal values of S and A. Given the principal's e¤ort choice (17) , …rm pro…ts can be written as:
4 To see this, note that:
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The …rst-order conditions to S and A are given by:
respectively. Although the …rst-order conditions are di¢ cult to solve algebraically, they are instructive in two ways. First, given the …rst-best solutions S F B and A F B derived in Lemma 2, both (19) and (20) are negative. 5 Hence, the …rst-best solutions cannot be optimal in case e¤ort is not contractible. Moreover, since k 1 and k 2 are assumed to be su¢ ciently large such that the second-order conditions are negative, in the optimum it must hold that S < S F B and A < A F B . 6 The intuition behind this result is straightforward. In case e¤ort is not contractible, a moral hazard problem in e¤ort provision arises. This problem is partly mitigated because employees are sensitive to social norms. However, as shown in Corollary 1, equilibrium norms for supervisors are always above …rst-best, whereas equilibrium norms for agents are always below …rst-best. As a result, it is less attractive to hire supervisors and agents. The implication is that the principal's span of control is distorted downwards relative to the …rst-best case.
Second, the marginal bene…t of hiring an agent (LHS of (20)) may be higher than the marginal bene…t of hiring a supervisor (LHS of (19) ). Rewriting this inequality 5 One can verify that, given the …rst-best solutions from Lemma 2, (19) and (20) reduce to: 
where the signs follows from 0 < < 1, p > 0, > 0, k 1 > 0, and k 2 > 0. 6 The second-order conditions are given by:
yields:
Hence, given that agents are relatively abundant, the marginal bene…t of hiring an agent exceeds the marginal bene…t from hiring a supervisor. The intuition behind this result stems directly from Proposition 4. Recall that this Proposition essentially states that the principal sets her e¤ort level such that the most abundant kind of employee faces the more e¢ cient norm in equilibrium. Therefore, given that agents are relatively abundant, the principal ensures that the equilibrium norm for agents is closer to its …rst-best level than the equilibrium norm for supervisors. 7 It follows that hiring agents yields a higher marginal bene…t. Of course, the reverse may also hold: given that supervisors are relatively abundant, their marginal bene…t is higher. Finally, each of the mechanisms described above may be at work in equilibrium, depending on the values of k 1 and k 2 . Figures 1 and 2 provide contour plots of the pro…t function (18) for a certain parameterization of the model. The inner contours represent a higher pro…t level than the outer contours, implying that the 7 In fact, the norm for agents is closer to the …rst-best level than the norm for supervisors when it holds that n 2 n F B 2 < n 1 n F B
1
. Taking into account that n 1 = e 0 , n 2 = e 0 , and n F B 1 = n F B 2 = p , one can show that this inequality is identical to condition (21). 17 maximum of the pro…t function is represented by the dots in the inner contours. In both …gures, the 45-degrees line depicts the …rst-best supervisor span of control, A S F B = k 1 k 2 . Figure 1 depicts a case where the …rst-best supervisor span of control is low ( k 1 k 2 = 0:1). Next, as can be seen in the plot, the maximum of …rm pro…ts (18) lies above the 45-degrees line, meaning that the principal distorts the supervisor's span of control downwards relative to the …rst-best case. The reason is that the supervision technology is such that it is attractive to hire relatively many supervisors. However, as described above, given that supervisors are relatively abundant, the principal optimally makes sure that supervisors'e¤ort norms are closer to the …rst-best level than agents'e¤ort norms. As a result, supervisors become even more attractive to hire, implying that the principal optimally distorts the supervisor's span of control downwards. Figure 2 depicts a case where the …rst-best supervisor span of control is high ( k 1 k 2 = 10). By the same logic as above, the principal then optimally distorts the supervisor's span of control upwards. The …nal Proposition summarizes the results of this subsection.
Proposition 5 Relative to the …rst-best case, hierarchical …rms optimally distort the principal's span of control downwards. Relative to the …rst-best case, the supervisor's span of control is optimally distorted downwards if k 1 k 2 low, and optimally distorted upwards if k 1 k 2 is high.
Concluding remarks
This paper sets out to study the problem of creating e¤ort norms within hierarchical …rms. The analysis presented above rests on one key premise, namely that the actual example of superiors determines e¤ort norms for subordinates. Norms are therefore shaped by two factors: the ultimate example set by those at the top of the hierarchy, like the CEO, and the process of transmitting this example to lower levels of the …rm. Importantly, …rms cannot control the process of norm transmission. After all, each hierarchical layer sets her own example for the next one. Consequently, norm transmission is prone to a moral hazard problem: no employee fully conforms with the norm he faces himself, as conforming requires him to exert costly e¤ort. The implication is that, in equilibrium, norms erode as one moves down the hierarchy. To counteract the norm erosion e¤ect, it has been shown that top managers optimally set a higher example to begin with. This is well in line with the fact that top managers work exceptionally long and hard. In addition to this, norm erosion gives rise to two comparative static results on the e¤ort of top managers. Their e¤ort decreases in the number of middle-managers hired, and increases in the number of lower-level employees hired. The analysis also yields three implications for organizational design. First, the ine¢ ciencies due to norm erosion imply that …rms optimally keep the extent of hierarchy to a minimum. Second, to reduce norm erosion, hierarchical …rms optimally promote employees with the strongest sensitivity to social norms. Last, hierarchical …rms optimally distort supervisor spans of control. The mechanism driving this result is that the relative pro…tability of hiring middle-managers and lower-level employees depends on whose equilibrium norm is more e¢ cient. the agent. Interestingly, this result is in line with Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) , who document that CEOs receive stronger incentives than executives with oversight authority, who in turn receive stronger incentives than managers with divisional responsibility.
